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Delayed Adoption of Rules:  
A Relational Theory of Firm  
Exposure and State Cooptation
Cyndi Man Zhang
Singapore Management University
Henrich R. Greve
INSEAD
The state creates and changes rules that coerce firms, but firms can delay or decouple responses to 
rule changes to manage the cost of demands. Theory of compliance to the state has not yet consid-
ered the degree to which the firm can delay adoption because of low exposure to rules and state 
links that allow cooptation, but both of these relations between state power and firm ability to 
counteract it can affect the adoption decision. This makes the response to state rule changes a more 
strategic outcome than the theory of coercive isomorphism implies. We develop a relational theory 
of delayed firm compliance to a state rule change that considers firm exposure due to discrepancy 
from the rule and firm cooptation of the state due to state links, and we test the theory by examining 
the adoption of the split-share structure reform, a state-mandated corporate governance reform 
among listed firms in China. We find that exposure and cooptation influenced the speed of adoption 
and the decoupling from reform intentions. We also found that their effects on firm response to 
coercion weaken when the new rule becomes institutionalized. Our theory of delayed compliance is 
also likely to apply to coercive pressure from other powerful organizations than the state.
Keywords: resource dependence; power; state rule change; firm compliance; institutional theory
Firms sometimes delay adoption of rules made by powerful actors such as the state and 
other rule-setting organizations in spite of the risks of slow adoption or noncompliance. Such 
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cases of noncompliance are found in a range of industries and can be highly consequential 
for society at large. For example, compliance to pollution regulation is incomplete and highly 
dependent on a voluntary institution (ISO 14001) even in the presence of rules, facility 
inspections, and punishment (Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Potoski & Prakash, 2005). Bank adop-
tion of the new U.S. Federal Reserve rules on capital buffers to prevent a repetition of the 
financial crisis has seen significant delays.1 Delay in adoption of state rules is not only con-
sequential for society but can also be detrimental for firms. For example, in 2014 major 
banks in Europe and the United States paid $65 billion in fines for regulatory noncompliance, 
mainly for price-fixing schemes and mortgage-lending irregularities with a wide span of 
victims.2 In China, the split-share structure reform made the stock market more efficient, but 
after a rapid 15 months of initial adoption the remaining one-fifth of the firms showed sig-
nificant delays. In the face of strong enforcement and sanctions, most firms eventually com-
ply with rules, but some show delayed and partial adoption. It is thus important and interesting 
to explore what factors lead firms to delay adoption of new rules.
The phenomenon of delayed and incomplete rule adoption has not been given sufficient 
attention in the literature. Institutional theory examines responses to rule changes through the 
theory of coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), yet there has been very little 
follow-up to the finding that it took 37 years for civil service reform to spread to all munici-
palities in the states in which it became required by law (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). This is a 
remarkably slow compliance by municipalities, who are supposed to follow the law, espe-
cially because they also have a duty to enforce it. Clearly, both public and private organiza-
tions delay adoption of state rules if they see them as too costly or risky (Ritchie & Melnyk, 
2012). Organizations also decouple displays of compliance from actual behaviors by adopt-
ing structures and roles that match the rules and by making adaptations to fit the organization 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This phenomenon is documented for practices that are adopted 
voluntarily, such as incentive schemes for executives (Westphal & Zajac, 1994), but it has 
seen little exploration in practices that are required by law or other forms of rules. The reason 
is partly that research on compliance to rules instituted through state coercion is a very small 
part of institutional theory, partly because it emphasizes isomorphism over delays in compli-
ance (Heugens & Lander, 2009).
Because institutional theory sees coercive pressures from the state or other powerful orga-
nizations as isomorphic across firms, we lack theory that can explain why some firms but not 
all can have delayed or decoupled compliance with legal change or other rule changes. Such 
theory requires a focus on the relationship between state and firm and thus becomes a rela-
tional theory of rule adoption. Delayed adoption could also be explained by contextual fac-
tors, such as lack of rule knowledge, lack of rule clarity, or lack of resources to follow it, but 
such factors say less about interorganizational relations and the relation between the rule-
making organization and the firm. The starting point of our theory is that coercive pressure is 
different from cognitive isomorphism because firms see coercive pressure as externally 
imposed rather than taken for granted (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). As a result, firms respond 
more strategically to coercive institutional pressures than to cognitive ones (Oliver, 1991). 
This means that the theoretical focus shifts from examining the state as having a homoge-
neous effect on firms to a relational theory of the state and firm interacting to either force 
quick adoption of the rule or create opportunities for delayed adoption. Consistent with this 
relational view, key elements of the theory can be drawn from resource dependence theory, 
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which specifies how firms manage demands from powerful organizations in the environment 
and make heterogeneous rather than isomorphic responses (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Wry, 
Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013).
The puzzle of delayed rule adoption can be analyzed by taking into account that firms may 
see the state as an actor in the environment that imposes resource-consuming demands and 
thus should be managed (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Rule changes not only place resource 
demands but also alter the institutional environment in ways that complicate adaptation and 
create risks for the firm (Ritchie & Melnyk, 2012). Even firms that intend to comply fully 
may follow a strategy of delayed adoption to let other firms go first, face the greatest uncer-
tainty, and provide failure and success examples from which they can learn. Delayed adop-
tion as a strategic response is consistent with evidence that firms differ in the implementation 
of rules on toxic chemicals information release (Doshi, Dowell, & Toffel, 2013) and environ-
mental site inspections (Berrone, Fosfuri, Gelabert, & Gomez-Mejia, 2013).
We examine whether firms delay or decouple compliance with coercive pressure to adopt 
rules mandating certain actions. We view state rule changes as a form of coercion that firms 
may follow but not necessarily immediately and fully. We develop theory specifying that the 
response is determined by two firm-state relations. The first relation that we examine is the 
firm exposure, where exposure is the degree of legal noncompliance as seen through the 
discrepancy between rule and current practice (e.g., Field, Lowry, & Shu, 2005; Shu, 2000). 
Greater exposure means having a greater difference between current practices and the prac-
tices that the new rules require. Exposed firms are more likely to be inspected for the compli-
ance to the new rule and penalized as examples for others to follow, generating pressure to 
adopt. The second relation that we examine is that firms may have links to the state that allow 
cooptation, which is defined as ability to access internal information about the state and 
anticipate and shape rule enforcement (Pfeffer, 1972). This information enables firms to 
delay the adoption. These relations are central because they capture state influence on the 
firm and firm management of state influence, respectively. Finally, we examine the interrela-
tion of these two firm-state relational factors with institutionalization: exposure and coopta-
tion are important early in the institutionalization process but become less impactful as the 
rule becomes institutionalized and has been adopted by many firms.
Our main contribution is to provide a relational theory and evidence supporting the claim 
that rule adoption specifically and firm compliance to coercive isomorphism more generally 
are variable across firms and can be explained by seeing the firm and the source of coercion 
as a dyadic power balance. Our relational theory draws on (a) resource dependence theory for 
analysis of how a firms manage their relations with the rule-setting organization and its 
demands and whether the social structure provides the opportunity to do so and (b) institu-
tional theory for analysis of how coercive pressures vary in strength over time. Our empirical 
evidence shows that delayed adoption is more likely when firms have low exposure and 
strong state links that allow cooptation and that these effects weaken as the rule is institution-
alized. As a broader contribution, we hope that this work brings attention to varying firm 
responses to coercive rules, a part of institutional theory that has been neglected, even though 
it provides important implications for firms’ strategic choices when adapting to their 
environments.
Our work also contributes to the debate on structure versus agency in institutional theory 
by shifting the focus back to a balanced view of the two forces. Influential work by DiMaggio 
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and Powell (1991) saw the examination of structure in the form of environmental influences 
on organizations as the central task of institutional theory, setting aside agency issues such as 
conflicts and interests as less important topics. Their view is consistent with later work that 
led to a lack of recognition regarding organizational influence in the adoption and adaptation 
of institutions[AQ: 1] (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997). Recent meta-analysis has shown the 
focus on isomorphism as dominant and organizational differences as less important, in part 
because this line of research has not been designed to explore differences (Heugens & Lander, 
2009). Our study, instead, is designed to explore such differences by examining agency 
through the organizational sources of delays in compliance timing and degree, in a context 
with very strong state pressures toward isomorphism.
We examine state coercion, which has often been found to produce rapid policy adoption by 
firms (Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010). A key state policy domain is corporate governance in the 
form of laws that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, and 
how control is exercised (Blair, 1995).[AQ: 2] We examine rule adoption through analysis of a 
corporate governance reform, the split-share stock ownership structure reform by listed firms in 
China between 2005 and 2012. This context highlights the theory’s ability to predict delayed or 
decoupled responses to rule changes because some firms delayed adoption of the reform even 
though delayed adoption risks sanction due to the state mandate. The delays are in part motivated 
by knowledge of the internal disputes in the state about the rule change, the potential repeal of 
the rule, and market uncertainty. Also, firms have strong interests in corporate governance, and 
it will be costly for them to make changes to it. Therefore, they have incentives to delay compli-
ance of the new rules to reduce cost and uncertainty. The cost and uncertainty of change in cor-
porate governance can involve conflicts between the firm and the state. The onus is on the firm 
to resolve the conflict by crafting the compliance strategy, which will be done differently depend-
ing on the firm exposure, state cooptation, and rule institutionalization.
Coercion as a Relation
We consider state coercion as a relation between a focal firm and the state in which the 
coercive pressure to adopt rule change differs among firms as a result of the power balance 
between firm and state (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The firm 
exposure to the rule change increases the likelihood of adoption, while the firm cooptation 
through state links helps it manage the power relation and gain discretion to allow delayed 
compliance. The firm-state relational factors of exposure and cooptation vary among firms 
and affect how the firm responds because they give firms different ability to manage the pres-
sure (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer, 1973). Both affect the firm differently at different stages of insti-
tutionalization, with the firm-state relation being more important when fewer prior adoptions 
have been made. As a result, predicting firm responses to coercion—especially early on—
requires relational theory on how well the state is positioned to influence a firm and how well 
the firm is positioned to manage the state influence.
Firm Exposure
Coercive pressures take the form of demands from powerful organizations or legal 
changes from states. We summarize these under the rubric of rule changes and note one 
important feature of rule changes: They invariably expose some firms more than others 
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because greater discrepancy between the current practice and the new rule imply that the rule 
design or enforcement could be targeted to these firms. The exposure of the firm can easily 
be compared across firms. As a result, the state can explicitly put more pressure on firms with 
more exposure, and managers can assess the exposure and preempt the state pressure through 
early adoption if the firm is highly exposed. Following state rules is a foundation of a positive 
relationship, whereas not complying with rules (reflected in a big discrepancy between prac-
tice and rule) will create tension between the firm and the state that can result in pressure 
applied to the firm. This makes the firm exposure an important firm-state relation.
In our context, we knew from informants that the state did apply pressure, but interestingly 
it was an executive whose firm deviated greatly from the new rule who made an interpretive 
link from the firm behavior to the pressure: “Ever since the announcement of the reform, our 
provincial government and SASAC [State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission] has held monthly mobilization meetings for all of us, the executives from prom-
inent listed firms, to ‘encourage’ us to adopt the reform as soon as possible. Of course it is in 
fact ‘enforcing’ us. I feel quite pressured because our firm has a huge portion of nontradable 
shares. I believe the government will keep holding frequent meetings like this until firms like 
us have all adopted.”3 The executive explicitly linked the high pressure to the firm’s wide 
discrepancy from the new rule even though the state had mobilization meetings with all large 
firms with nontradable shares, thus enforcing the same rule on all the subjected firms.
The exposure influences firm assessments of the coercive pressure, which in turn drives the 
firm to adopt practices that follow the new rules. A highly exposed firm with wide discrepancy 
from the new rule is disadvantaged in its relation to the state and hence likely to be a potential 
target of fines or other penalties, whereas a less exposed firm is in a safer position in its rela-
tion to the state and likely to avoid sanctions. The logic behind such assessments is that a state 
enforcement agency will direct punitive action against the firms least in compliance with the 
new rules because enforcement is most effective when directed at prominent noncompliant 
actors (Lott, 1996; Yiu, Xu, & Wan, 2014). The exposure will also attract stakeholder attention 
(King & Soule, 2007; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003) and make firms visible exemplars (Wry, 
Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011) and easy targets of inspection for conformity. Hence, the greater 
a firm’s exposure to a rule change, the greater is the pressure to change. Coercive pressures 
may also expose firm misalignment with emerging rules and trigger internal questioning of 
existing practices that do not match the new rules (Edelman, 1992). Thus, firms with great 
exposure to a rule change will have a narrow range of actions possible and are pushed to adopt 
the new rules rapidly. Conversely, low firm exposure means less likelihood of punitive action 
or stakeholder pressure and, hence, greater ability to delay adoption.
The effect of exposure on rule compliance has been neglected in research so far (though 
see Berrone et al., 2013), but there is some predecessor theoretical and empirical work. 
Exposure is related to the process of enactment in resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978), where the decision makers of a firm seek to understand environmental 
demands through monitoring active influence attempts, such as lawsuits or boycotts, and 
seeking to anticipate potential influence attempts arising from strong discrepancy with what 
external actors would like the firm to do (Banaszak-Holl, Mitchell, Baum, & Berta, 2006; 
Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk, 1999; King, 2008). Decision makers may disagree on the impor-
tance of compliance, but even when there is disagreement, firm exposure to a state rule 
becomes important because it is a strong argument in favor of rapid adoption (Briscoe, Chin, 
& Hambrick, 2014; Briscoe & Safford, 2008; Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Jonsson & Regnar, 
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2009). High exposure thus creates urgency in the rule adoption, and conversely, low expo-
sure allows delayed adoption:
Hypothesis 1a: A firm with low exposure is more likely to delay new rule adoption.
Low exposure also enables decoupling. When regulations are ambiguous, they offer firms 
wide latitude to construct the meaning of compliance in a way that alleviates the conflict 
between environmental demands and managerial interests (Edelman, 1992). Firms decouple by 
displaying visible symbols of compliance to show their attention to regulations while choosing 
behaviors with an actual compliance lower than the symbolic one (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Decoupling lets firms appear to comply with regulations and norms pertaining to their structure 
and operation rather than follow the full intent of the rules (Scott, 2001; Tilcsik, 2010; Westphal 
& Zajac, 1994). In our context, decoupling meant complying with the letter of a law intended 
to increase transparency but in a firm-specific and nontransparent way. Decoupling not only 
allows easier continuation of operations but can also reduce internal opposition against a new 
rule (Raaijmakers, Vermeulen, Meeus, & Zietsma, 2015). However, because exposure from the 
wide discrepancy from the new rule can attract state attention to the firm-state relation, decou-
pling the adoption from the new rule is risky. The difficulty again arises from two sources. 
Internally, decision makers favoring full compliance can argue that the high exposure makes 
full compliance necessary due to the regulatory attention that the firm is likely to receive. 
Externally, increased regulatory attention is a likely consequence of exposure, which also 
focuses decision maker attention on the potential cost of enforcement action (Delmas & 
Montes-Sancho, 2010). Exposed firms thus have fewer options also with respect to decoupling. 
Firms with low exposure, however, have more leeway because of the lower state attention, giv-
ing them greater ability to choose the preferred option of decoupled adoption:
Hypothesis 1b: A firm with low exposure is more likely to decouple the rule adoption.
State Cooptation
Another firm-state relation is a firm’s cooptation with the state through state links. 
Cooptation is defined as the ability to access internal information about the state and antici-
pate and shape rule enforcement (following Pfeffer, 1972). Firms that have state links can 
gain information on the legal changes, such as the content and expected level of enforcement, 
and try to influence them (Peng & Heath, 1996; Peng & Luo, 2000; Ritchie & Melnyk, 
2012). These actions allow a broader range of actions, as when lobbying for exceptions is 
successful or provides knowledge of exceptions that other firms have obtained (Silverstein & 
Hohler, 2010). However, cooptation is a bilateral exchange, so the firm receiving favors 
implies an obligation to follow state instructions faithfully.
Combining these arguments, scholars have hypothesized that firms that are well con-
nected to the state may receive more coercive pressures for institutional change, so they will 
respond to change quickly. Conversely, firms that are less connected to the state may be less 
aware of institutional expectations (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989) and less receptive to 
pressure (Westphal & Zajac, 2001; Zuckerman, 1999). This theory suggests that ties to the 
state predict swift compliance; however, evidence on this proposition is weak (e.g., Sutton & 
Dobbin, 1996). One important limitation of this argument is that it is based on the assumption 
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that the state has reached internal agreement about the effectiveness of the new rule and is 
determined to enforce compliance, so firms with state links will not exploit their information 
advantage before adoption. However, in practice that assumption is often not satisfied in rule 
changes. The state can mandate a rule but later withdraw it due to doubts about its effective-
ness, and the state can mandate a rule and later adjust it in response to adverse consequences. 
Because rule instability is a possibility, firms with a state link do not necessarily comply 
quickly to a rule change. There is already empirical evidence of state ties causing weaker rule 
enforcement (Karpoff et al., 1999), so the simple idea of quick compliance through state con-
nections is incomplete.
In practice, the state does not necessarily reach internal agreement about the effectiveness 
of a new rule due to its uncertain impact. Different internal and external stakeholders of the 
state will have divergent perspectives on the rule-setting process so that disagreement and 
disputes occur, as in any political governance system (March & Olsen, 1989). If the uncer-
tainty of rule enforcement is high due to internal state dispute, firms with strong state links 
will use their connections with the state as a device of cooptation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
to reduce compliance with state initiatives deemed to be risky. Specifically, firms with state 
links hold information advantages on current debates, possible future rule changes, and 
planned enforcement (Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999; Hinthorne, 1996; Karpoff 
et al., 1999) that enable them to make a better strategic response to coercive pressures (Getz, 
1993). For example, their direct links provide firsthand information about the political strug-
gle within the state and transfer knowledge of whether the dispute can be resolved and which 
camp is dominant. Cooptation reduces the uncertainty of the effects of the coercive pressures 
and allows actions that reduce their burden (Hillman, 2005; Levitsky & Murillo, 2009).
Flow of personnel between state and firm results in formation of coalitional ties to build 
personal networks of influence (Peng, 2003; Peng & Luo, 2000). Close connection to the 
state allows firms to make a more informed interpretation of the rationale behind the imposed 
practice. Thus, cooptation lets firms collect information from the state and reduce their risk 
of delayed compliance (Silverstein & Hohler, 2010). Also, as firms monitor the policy risk 
and accumulate inside information about the state’s intent to enforce the rule change, they are 
able to delay their responses until the policy becomes definite and early adopters show posi-
tive outcomes of compliance. During the delay, their ties to the state make it easy to find 
arguments to support their delayed responses because they know what reasons they can give 
to justify being slow (J. Li & Qian, 2013). They will also have direct supporters in the state 
because a cooptation link becomes a durable relation, generating a motivation to support the 
firm and an expectation that this support will be reciprocated (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
This opportunity to delay to learn more about the consequence of the policy change can be 
risky if connected firms have high exposure. However, these firms also have some negotiating 
ability because the cooptation allows them to bargain for exceptions to the rule. Similar to the 
“too big to fail” argument in banking, they can plead difficulties from being too big, too com-
plex, and too important to change while requesting greater institutional privileges and greater 
access to alternative bases for attracting resources. As a firm executive noted, “if firms like us 
trigger a stock market drop during the reform, it would be a disaster for the people up there in 
the state. Through our informal interaction, they have been explicit to us that we need to make 
sure all types of shareholders are taken care of. But, as a result, they have to be patient with us 
because we are not going to do this quickly. It is also for their own sake if they do not want to 
see quick but failed adopters.” Such rationales and the ability to plead directly help firms 
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overcome the deterrence of the state because they protect the firms from state sanctions for 
noncompliance (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008). Therefore, 
firms with state links have a better chance of retaining the status quo in the face of coercive 
change and negotiating a delay (Guillen, 2000; Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Confronted with a 
policy that is debated in the state, firms with state links that see the rule as costly have the 
opportunity and capability to delay their response. This reasoning leads to the following:
Hypothesis 2a: A firm with state links is more likely to delay rule adoption.
The cooptation advantages obtained through state links also affect decoupling. It is a central 
insight of cooptation theory that the relation is bilateral: the firm has increased ability to predict 
and control the actions of the coopted organization (here, the state), but in return the cooptation 
obliges the firm to follow direct and often detailed influence from the state (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Here the theory makes a clear distinction between the outcomes that would be most ben-
eficial for the firm and the outcomes that can be achieved because cooptation involves exchange 
of favors. This sets in motion a process that reduces the likelihood that a firm with state links will 
decouple its adoption of the rule. The ability to influence the state is not sustainable over time if 
the influence is too one-sided, because cooptation is an implicit exchange of favors among indi-
viduals in the network linking the state and corporate actors (Peng & Luo, 2000). The firm gains 
the favor of learning more about the flexibility of the rule, and it returns the favor by adopting 
the original proposed rule rather than a decoupled version that could be seen as an implicit rejec-
tion of the rule. Thus, firms use state links for cooptation, and they maintain these links through 
a faithful adoption of the original rule. This trade-off is beneficial to firms because adoption 
affects many stakeholders, creating a highly uncertain environment that firms prefer to avoid, 
even at the cost of staying with the original rule. It is acceptable to the state if the favor of delay-
ing adoption extended to only a few firms and to only a certain extent for these firms, so the 
momentum of rule adoption is not weakened. These arguments lead to the following:
Hypothesis 2b: A firm with state links is less likely to decouple the rule adoption.
It is useful to point out that Hypothesis 2a has a plausible counterhypothesis and thus is an 
important empirical question. First, if state links mean that the firm is capable of influencing 
the rule change, it will be more likely to accept it and thus be an early adopter (opposite of 
Hypothesis 2a) of the standard rule (same as Hypothesis 2b). Second, if cooptation lets the 
firms get information about impending changes earlier, they will be able to prepare for the 
change earlier and more effectively (opposite of Hypothesis 2a). We specify Hypothesis 2a 
rather than the counterhypothesis because the main reason to delay adoption was fear of an 
adverse market reaction and following policy reversal, which would be difficult to overcome 
through influencing the rule change or gaining information about the rule content early. The 
contrast between these arguments makes Hypothesis 2a an important empirical question.
Institutionalization
The impact of the two firm-state relational factors on a firm’s adoption strategy facing 
coercive pressure is likely to change over time. A classic prediction on the adoption of insti-
tutions is that any firm-level characteristics that initially predict adoption will become less 
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influential later on, as institutionalization of the new practice causes mimetic adoptions to 
become more important (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). The logic 
behind this prediction is that the pressures to make firms comply are not objectively assessed 
but rather discovered and enacted by firm decision makers (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). If the 
firm has great exposure, the potential for enforcement actions means that early adoption is 
beneficial regardless of whether other organizations also adopt early. When most other firms 
have adopted, the exposure becomes less important for the decision because the coercive 
pressure from the state is supplemented with mimetic pressure from other firms that already 
comply, reducing the potential for further delay. This makes the degree of institutionalization 
important for understanding the effect of the firm-state relation on coercive pressures.
The same logic can be applied to the effect of cooptation. From the firm point of view, 
state links bring particular advantage and value when the choice of whether to adopt still 
seems open, leaving firms with a state link the option of late adoption to let other firms com-
ply first and expose the risk of adoption. However, as the new rule is institutionalized, the 
situation changes in two ways. First, the state’s tolerance for delayed adoption gets reduced 
as the policy gains stability and there are fewer noncompliant firms that can become targets 
of rule enforcement. Second, the value of delay is reduced because many prior adoptions can 
already be observed and their effects assessed. Thus, the effect of state links on the speed of 
compliance is weaker when many other firms have adopted.
From the state point of view, cooptation could have different usage early and late in the 
institutionalization process. Recall that the cooptation is bilateral, with the firm exerting 
influence on the state but with the state also having the opportunity to directly influence 
specific firms. Because the state is interested in prominent firms complying with the rule 
change quickly, to encourage other firms to adopt the new rule, it may select some firms as 
early adopters and instruct the state-linked board members of those firms to support adop-
tion. To focus on firm cooptation of the state, we do not hypothesize this effect, but our 
empirical investigation is designed to allow detection of it.
The prediction of greater influence of firm characteristics initially has been examined and 
supported (e.g., Scott, 2001).[AQ: 3] However, the original study making this prediction 
tested it only for the population of organizations in which there was no state rule requiring 
adoption of the practice, and it made no test for the population in which adoption resulted from 
a state rule change with coercive pressure (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). This is an omission for 
the theory of coercive isomorphism because state rule changes also have firms that are more 
or less willing to adopt early on, as argued already, but these sources of willingness or resis-
tance are likely to change as more firms adopt the new rule. Thus, exposure and cooptation 
predict compliance with state rule changes less well when many other firms have adopted:
Hypothesis 3a: Firm exposure has a lower effect on the rate of adoption when many other firms have 
adopted the new rule.
Hypothesis 3b: State links have a lower effect on the rate of adoption when many other firms have 
adopted the new rule.
The Split-Share Structure Reform in China
We examine these hypotheses using a context and a rule change that make the tension 
between state coercion and firm action particularly strong: the split-share stock ownership 
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structure reform in China. Stock ownership reform is an important rule change because 
ownership and control are central features of firms and because changes can be controver-
sial for the state and costly for firms. Prior to 2005, listed firms in China had a split-share 
structure in which ownership shares were partially nontradable. Nontradable shares are a 
special class of shares giving the shareholders the same ownership rights (e.g., to vote or to 
receive a dividend) as holders of tradable shares, but trading of these shares was restricted. 
A typical Chinese listed firm had three major categories of ownership (Qi, Wu, & Zhang, 
2000[AQ: 4]): (a) state shares owned by the central or provincial government agencies 
(SASACs), as well as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) wholly owned by the state; (b) legal 
person shares owned by various domestic institutions comprising SOEs (partially owned by 
the state), private industrial firms, and nonbank financial institutions; and (c) ordinary 
shares owned by individual investors and private institutional investors. Of these, state 
shares and legal person shares constituted nontradable shares. Since incorporation, every 
listed firm’s equity had nontradable shares. Up to 2004, they could be transacted only 
through negotiations among designated parties, if approved by the regulatory authorities.
The split-share structure constituted a unique governance structure of Chinese listed firms, 
hindering the healthy growth and maturity of the financial market. Following the shift in eco-
nomic logic from state socialism4 to market capitalism (Greve & Zhang, 2016), the central gov-
ernment saw it as an obstacle to economic growth and mandated conversion of nontradable 
shares into tradable shares, which started May 9, 2005. The strength of the state pressure is 
clearly illustrated by the speed of the initial adoption, with 80% adoption reached in 15 months. 
The adoption also neared completeness: by the end of 2012, 96% of all firms that were subject 
to the reform had completed or initiated the adoption of the reform. The significant delays in 
adoption speed after reaching a high adoption rate shows that some firms resisted the state pres-
sure (Figure 1). This is thus a good case for examining how some firms delay compliance despite 
strong coercive pressure. The split-share structure reform was a legal mandate motivated by 
important and urgent national policy goals, so although policy enforcement can be adapted to the 
economic conditions of each province, it was the type of rule change for which the central 
Chinese government applies close firm inspection and regulatory enforcement through frequent 
mobilization meetings in every province (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011). Most adoptions followed the 
standard plan endorsed by regulators, but a minority instead initiated a tailored plan. Such vari-
ance in choosing whether to comply with the state-prescribed conversion method allows exami-
nation of factors influencing decoupling from the original regulatory intent.
Background of the Split-Share Structure Reform
The split-share structure reform was a key continuation of China’s economic transition 
from a centrally planned redistributive economy to a market economy, which had already 
started remaking its economic institutions at the time of the reform (Nee, 1992). The opening 
of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 1990 and 1991 signaled the regime’s 
resolve to shift from the prevailing economic logic of state socialism to one of market capi-
talism, with a focus on increased self-reliance for individuals and reduced financial demands 
on the state by relaxing government control of the market, partially privatizing SOEs and 
promoting the national stock exchange (G. Jiang, Yue, & Zhao, 2009).
A major issue of the stock market in China is that each nontradable share had a low price 
when the listed firm was incorporated, but the price of each tradable share was much higher. 
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Nevertheless, each share has the same voting right, though at different prices. The nontrad-
able shareholders were typically the initial (often state or SOE) founder of the listed firm. 
Therefore, tradable shareholders needed to pay more for each share of equity and still had 
little power in a firm’s decision making, while the nontradable shareholders were the key 
decision makers of the firm and were much less susceptible to stock value fluctuations.
The split-share structure and the many nontradable shares were blamed for the slump in 
China’s stock exchange through the 2001-2005 period (B. B. Jiang, Laurenceson, & Tang, 
2008), with a total decline in market capitalization of >50%, and were regarded as a long-
term hurdle to the development of domestic financial market institutions. A range of adverse 
effects were identified (Liao, Liu, & Wang, 2014): First, the conflict of interest between 
shareholders (i.e., tradable vs. nontradable) was severe, which led to strategy inconsistencies 
(Chen & Young, 2010). Second, holders of tradable shares were typically small, diverse in 
background, and dispersed in location. The lack of incentive and knowledge among nontrad-
able shareholders[AQ: 5] to participate in firm decision making resulted in limited supervi-
sion of management decisions, a problem particularly salient to firms under long-standing 
state control (Shleifer, 1998). Third, the small public float for listed companies on the stock 
market made shares relatively illiquid, volatile, and vulnerable to market manipulation and 
insider trading. Fourth, the market inefficiencies induced many valuable Chinese companies 
to list overseas, inhibiting domestic investors’ access to high-performing local companies. 
Overall, the split-share structure was thought to undermine market institutions and hold back 
China’s economic reform.
Reform Process
On April 29, 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), a central gov-
ernmental agency equivalent to the Stock Exchange Commission in the United States, 
announced that all nontradable shares should be converted to tradable shares. Two decisions 
had to be made by nontradable shareholders of listed firms: (a) when to adopt the reform and 
(b) how to compensate tradable shareholders on their diluted share value given the increase 
Figure 1
Diffusion of the Split-Share Structure Reform, 2005-2012
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in liquid shares after conversion. In each firm, nontradable shareholders had to file a request 
to the board of directors and have the reform proposal audited externally. The board publi-
cized the reform proposal, if approved, and set the agenda for a shareholders’ meeting to 
proceed with the negotiation with tradable shareholders. The date of the announcement was 
considered to be the firm’s reform adoption time. The conversion of stock was done on the 
implementation day after both the nontradable and tradable shareholders approved the com-
pensation method by voting.
The official implementation details of the reform5 specified that methods of compensation 
for the tradable shareholders would be determined by structured private negotiations between 
nontradable and tradable shareholders. The CSRC advocated the standard plan of compensa-
tion, whereby nontradable shareholders issued a negotiated consideration ratio of bonus 
shares to compensate tradable shareholders. This method was transparent and regarded as the 
most legitimate implementation of the reform, both because of its regulatory approval and 
because it left less room for concealed benefits to one of the negotiating parties. A minority 
of firms instead adopted a set of alternative methods, the tailored plan, which involved inter-
nal asset and debt reconfiguration, offering call or put warrants, guaranteeing stock buybacks 
at preset prices, paying cash, transferring assets, or writing off debts. Although this method 
formally adhered to the rules, it was decoupled because it reflected firm control rather than 
the state goal of isomorphic procedures. The resulting compensation schemes varied by firm 
conditions and negotiating power and had less transparent economic and control conse-
quences (Wu, Zheng, Lin, Li, & Wu, 2006).
Reform Controversy
Before 2005, the CSRC had already recognized the defects of the split-share structure and 
debated whether and how to convert nontradable shares into tradable shares. The CSRC had 
launched an attempt to convert nontradable shares in 2001, but it led to negative stock market 
reactions and was finally abandoned (Cooper, 2008; Liao et al., 2014). The aborted reform, 
the underperformance of listed firms, and a general lack of confidence in market institutions 
combined to generate uncertainty among government and market players. Drawing from 
these lessons, from 2001 onward, the CSRC issued a series of corporate laws to provide 
greater protection for minority investors and started a new wave of the reform.
Despite this preparation, the split-share structure reform had been controversial, with pro-
longed discussion in the central government that included debates on the effectiveness of the 
reform and whether and how to implement it. Substantial resistance typically arose to any 
format of economic transition and market reform involving further privatization and looser 
state control, especially among the communist party officials, government bureaucrats, and 
SOEs (Xu, Lu, & Gu, 2014). Opponents continued to refer to the earlier failed attempt to 
release the nontradable shares to the market to emphasize the uncertainty about the outcomes 
of the reform (Liao et al., 2014). There was sufficient knowledge about the debate within the 
state to give firms reason to believe that the rule change might be repealed.
The goal of institutionalizing a fully tradable shareholding structure reflected the state’s 
interest in refining stock market institutions and improving firms’ financial efficiency. 
However, at the beginning of this reform, many officials in the public sector and state-
appointed agents who represented state shares in firms strongly objected (Cooper, 2008; Hua, 
2010). They insisted that China’s economy was not yet ready for this rapid reduction of state 
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control over the financial market, and the listed firms were not prepared for a fully liquid 
governance structure. One state official recalled, “We thought that reform was a strong signal 
of further selling off crucial national asset to private sectors. We had many meetings and dis-
cussions about it, and people were anxious and confused facing this radical decision by the 
CSRC. Honestly, we were not sure whether the central government has thought this through.” 
The quote illustrates well how the clear and publicly announced requirement came against a 
background of conflict within the state. Firms with state links would be able to understand the 
conflict better and assess its consequences for the timing and form of adoption.
Adoption Risk
Since the start of the split-share structure reform, firms faced the decision of when and how 
to adopt the reform, and they needed to strategically evaluate the costs and benefits of being 
quick or slow to respond to the state mandate. If they adopted the reform quickly, they might 
experience a stock price drop, and stock price drops in multiple firms could result in a repeal 
of the rule, judging from the previous experience of the failed reform. The benefit of being an 
early adopter was that the CSRC would reward firms with priority access to state-controlled 
resources, such as bank loans. The sanctions against slow adopters were not fully spelled out, 
but they were blocked from raising capital through secondary offerings (Cooper, 2008), and 
the state could also withhold other crucial resources. Thus, the rule change led to certain risks 
of noncompliance but uncertainty about who would be hit and the strength of the penalties.
Data and Methodology
Data Sources
The China Stock Market and Accounting Research database and the WIND database are 
the main data sources for the study. The database covers the ownership structure and finan-
cial performance of all listed firms in China to date since 1992 as well as data on board 
members and top management teams, including board members’ curriculum vitae. It has 
been widely used in finance (D. Li, Moshirian, Nguyen, & Tan, 2007; Lin & Su, 2008) and 
economics research (Rousseau & Xiao, 2008). The WIND database provides detailed infor-
mation on firm adoptions of the split-share structure reform, including the date of the 
announcement of reform proposal by the board of directors, the attendance rate and voting 
outcome of the shareholding meetings about the reform plan, and the negotiated compensa-
tion method of the reform.
The quantitative study was supplemented with eight interviews with key insiders—gov-
ernment officials at SASACs, institutional investors, and senior managers in two prominent 
listed firms to draw inferences about the rationales for the adoption of the reform. These 
interviews were conducted after the theory development and were done to check that the 
reform adoption was driven mainly by the factors treated in the theory above. Because of the 
complex ties between the state and firms through ownership, personnel exchange, and regu-
lation, it was useful to follow a grounded theory approach to let insiders describe their deci-
sion making to allow mapping of statements matching the theory, as well as any statements 
suggesting routes of influence outside the theory. The interviews allowed us to check that the 
relational factors that we developed were indeed the main drivers of adoption.
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Estimation Method and Dependent Variables
The data comprised 1,356 firms that were subject to the reform since 2005. We con-
ducted event history analysis of the adoption time and logit analysis of the choice of adop-
tion plan. The adoption time is operationalized as the duration from the April 29, 2005, 
announcement of the split-share reform requirement to the date of the firm’s announce-
ment of its adoption of a split-share unification proposal, as this date indicates agreement 
among the key stakeholders on this change. The adoption plan is operationalized as the 
choice of the standard plan or the tailored plan. In the analysis of the plan choice, the data 
were the plan choices by the firms that successfully completed the reform. After missing 
data deletions, we had data for 1,354 firms in the event history analysis and 1,286 adop-
tions in the adoption plan analysis.
Because the research question focused on the firm’s intention to adopt the new rule, the 
announcement of the submission of the proposal for an adoption was coded as an event, irre-
spective of whether the reform proposal passed or failed at the shareholder meeting. Because 
adoption would remove a need for readoption and because a vote against adoption would be 
likely to significantly change the decision-making process, a firm that has proposed adoption 
generated no more observations in the subsequent periods. Only four proposals failed to win 
support at the shareholding meeting.
In a continuous-time event history model of adoption time, the controls for the influence 
of time are important. The most flexible control was applied through the Cox proportional 
hazards model (Cox, 1972). Unlike parametric event history models, such as the exponential 
or Gompertz model, the Cox model lets the effect of time on the hazard rate vary freely per 
the data. This flexibility makes the Cox model a particularly safe choice when time effects 
have a shape not well captured by other models. We can obtain the same results using the 
exponential model with time interval controls, so the choice of the Cox model is for caution 
only. The Cox time axis was historical time, and tied event times were handled by the exact 
partial-likelihood method to get the most accurate estimates.
Independent Variables
Exposure
We measured exposure as the proportion of nontradable shares because this shows the 
discrepancy between current practice and the new rule. The proportion of nontradable shares 
varies across firms, owing to differences in the initial equity and subsequent movement of 
shares from nontradable to tradable status and hence reflecting a firm’s discrepancy between 
its current share structure and the fully tradable shareholding structure required by the reform.
State links
Two separate but related measures are used to measure the state links of the firm. The first 
is a direct measure of cooptation through capturing the movement of individuals from state 
positions to the board of the firm, and it equals the proportion of board members with a cur-
rent or past position in a government agency. Preliminary testing comparing this variable 
with a variable counting only agencies with direct supervision of firms showed that the more 
inclusive variable used here had better explanatory power.
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Alternatively, cooptation can be captured through the firm association with the state hier-
archy. Every listed firm in China with state shares reports to the respective controlling state 
agency across national, provincial, and local hierarchical levels. At each level, the SASACs 
have the right to appoint and supervise key agents to listed firms to assert the right of the 
state’s shareholding. Firms associated with central government and the central SASAC are 
connected to the highest level of the state: they often belong to crucial industries that operate 
nationally and have closer relationships with central policy makers (Walder, 1995). Listed 
firms monitored by provincial governments and SASACs are connected locally to a lower 
state hierarchy, which pressures them to follow state rules because they are, in turn, under 
pressure from the central state. Such firms have weaker links with the rule-setting central 
state and thus are less able to gain information and seek influence. Firms that are not directly 
monitored by any level of SASACs have the weakest linkage with the state. The variable is 
given the value of 1 for firms without a state tie, 2 for firms with a provincial tie, and 3 for a 
firm associated with the central government.
These two variables trace cooptation well because of the systematic way in which the state 
uses personnel movement to monitor firms while giving firms the converse ability to influ-
ence the state through the contacts of the same individuals. We enter the variables as main 
effects and as interactions with the number of past adoptions to test the effect of institution-
alization. In a preliminary analysis, we entered the proportion of state ownership, instead of 
board members with state experience, and found similar results. We thus found that state 
cooptation can be captured either indirectly through the state ownership or directly through 
individuals with state background. We retain state ownership share as a control variable.
Control variables
We control for the age of listed firms, which captures how long the firm had been operat-
ing in the old governance system. A firm’s size can influence risk-taking behavior and was 
controlled through the log of the firm total assets (Audia & Greve, 2006). We control for 
industry effects by including 12 major industry category dummies (13 industries with 1 as the 
baseline) and 30 region dummies (31 in total with 1 as the baseline). We added a dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm’s stocks were included in the China Securities Index 
(CSI 300). CSI 300 is a stock market index that consists of 300 stocks listed on the Shanghai 
or Shenzhen stock exchange. The firms in the index are usually chosen to reflect the price 
fluctuation and performance of China’s stock market, which could affect their decisions on 
the adoption of the split-share structure reform given the stock index impact.
We also considered the impact of a firm’s growth opportunities on the reform adoption 
decisions, using the market-to-book ratio to capture this effect. We included the debt-to-
equity ratio to capture the potential impact of a firm’s financial leverage on reform adoption 
decisions. Also, firms make decisions to change according to their past performance (Greve, 
1998). Recent studies of firms’ responses to institutional changes show that sustaining and 
achieving economic gain is of equal importance with obtaining social legitimacy as a ratio-
nale for practice adoption decisions (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). Thus, a 1-year lagged perfor-
mance measure is entered to control for firms’ economic motivation. We selected return on 
assets (ROA) as the performance measure because it has been widely used as a performance 
measure that can be compared across industries (Shinkle, 2012). Greater overseas sales can 
also affect the reform adoption decision because firms with overseas presence may seek to 
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have a market-oriented governance structure, so we included the proportion of sales over-
seas. The decision to initiate a reform can be influenced by the change in the upper echelons 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), especially the succession of the 
chairman of the board or the CEO. Thus, the analysis has a dummy variable indicating if the 
firm has changed its board chairman or CEO in the previous year.
We included variables describing board characteristics that could influence the knowledge 
of and preference for the reformed ownership structure. The board of directors is the correct 
decision-making group for reincorporating in accordance with the new rule, as they make the 
decision and mediate the negotiations that follow. The first is the average age of the board 
members, which is a proxy for total experience. The rest are all proportions of board mem-
bers with a specific characteristic and thus capture its prevalence in the board. We have the 
proportions of members with graduate degrees (master or PhD), independent directors, top 
management team members, and members who get some salary or payment from the firm 
(firms can pay board members even if they are not top management team members). Also, 
we have the proportion of board members with a finance role in the corporation and the pro-
portion of board members who own shares in the corporation. Expectations for these control 
variables are not completely clear, because they depend on how the board members assess 
the consequences of the reform, but independent board members and top management team 
members often have divergent interests. Board members with a finance role or with stock 
ownership are more familiar with the stock market and less so with the state and can be 
expected to view exposure to the new state rule as a potential threat that deserves attention.
According to the theory on herd behavior, firms tend to mimetically adopt a practice if 
others have adopted it. They believe that the decisions of others are rational such that their 
adoptions imply positive information about the practice (Greve, 1996). In the adoption analy-
sis, the Cox model controls for this effect because it fully controls for temporal changes in 
the hazard rate. In the binary outcome logit model, the same issue is addressed by controlling 
for the number of prior adoptions using the standard plan.
Results
Adoption Likelihood
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the Cox model of the adoption of split-share 
reform are shown in Table 1. The table shows low correlations, including the two measures 
of state links. In Table 2, the modeling starts with only control variables in Model 1, followed 
by all hypothesis-testing variables with either the board proportion holding a state position or 
the state hierarchy indicating the state link. Models 2 and 3 show that exposure has a positive 
and significant coefficient, indicating that it makes delayed adoption less likely, as predicted 
by Hypothesis 1a. Firms that diverge more from the coercive state’s intended practices appear 
to be influenced by exposure and to adopt more rapidly. Both measures of state links—pro-
portion of board members with state positions in Model 2 and state hierarchy in Model 3—
show negative and significant coefficients, in support of Hypothesis 2a, although state 
position is only marginally significant. Thus, the state links provide cooptation that allows 
firms to delay adoption of the coercive but controversial split-share structure reform.
The effects of control variables remain similar across all the models. The older the firm, 
the less likely it will be to adopt the reform, whereas the bigger the firm, the more likely it 
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will be to adopt the reform. None of the CSI 300 dummy variables, debt-to-equity ratio, and 
market-to-book ratio had a significant impact on a firm’s adoption speed, indicating that a 
Table 2
Results for Cox Model of Split Share Reform Adoption
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Age −0.07** −0.06** −0.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.12** 0.13** 0.13**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
CSI 300 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Debt to equity 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market to book −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Return on assets 3.22** 3.30** 3.30**
(0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Proportion overseas sales 0.28 0.31 0.32
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Proportion state shares −0.17 −0.29* −0.13
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15)
Change in chair or CEO −0.06 −0.07 −0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Board average age −0.00 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Board proportion graduate degree 0.14 0.24+ 0.20
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Board proportion independent directors 0.53 0.51 0.52
(0.61) (0.61) (0.61)
Board proportion top management team members 0.41 0.32 0.31
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Board proportion paid by company 0.16 0.22 0.17
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Board proportion finance role −1.31+ −1.20+ −1.32+
(0.70) (0.70) (0.71)
Board proportion shareholders 0.57** 0.62** 0.64**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Exposure 1.12** 1.02**
 (0.31) (0.31)
Board proportion state position −0.25+  
 (0.14)  
State hierarchy −0.16**
 (0.05)
Likelihood ratio, χ2 (df) 394.41** (60) 410.09** (62) 417.87** (62)
Likelihood ratio vs. Model 1 12.19** 19.97**
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Two-sided z tests for coefficients.
+p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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firm’s response to a coercive change is not related to the stock market even though the reform 
is about stock transaction rights. ROA in the previous year is positively related to the adop-
tion decision, so high-performing firms are more likely to adopt the reform. The effect of 
ROA can be interpreted to mean that high performance increases exposure as well, leading to 
earlier adoption. This is a post hoc interpretation, however, so we cannot be sure, and unre-
ported additional analyses showed that ROA was a main effect that did not interact with the 
other hypothesis-testing variables. The board proportion variables show that boards with 
many shareholding directors are significantly more likely to adopt, suggesting that they are 
indeed more concerned about noncompliance with state rules leading to potential penalties.
Table 3 has additional models that test the hypotheses on how the effect of firm exposure 
and state cooptation is influenced by the degree of institutionalization. Again, we test the two 
measures of state links separately. Model 4 enters the interaction of exposure and the number 
of prior adopters over time, showing that the interaction effect has a significant coefficient 
estimate that is negative, opposite of the main effect of exposure. This supports Hypothesis 
3a that the effect of exposure is stronger initially. Model 5 and 6 each test the effect of one of 
the state link cooptation variables and show interesting effects. The positive and significant 
signs of state cooptation main effects in Model 5 and Model 6 and the negative and signifi-
cant effects of their interactions with prior adoptions show that state cooptation also initially 
increases the adoption rate. However, this effect declines and then reverses as this rule 
becomes institutionalized, and for most of the period, firms with state links had a lower rate 
of new rule adoption.
Although the declining effect over time supports Hypothesis 3b, the new result of a posi-
tive initial effect was not hypothesized and instead suggests a more differentiated pattern of 
compliance. It appears that some firms with cooptation opportunities were unable to use 
them; instead, the state link was actually used for influence in the reverse direction, from 
state to firm, making these firms exemplars of early adoption. Examination of the early-
adopting firms strongly suggests that some firms with state links were specifically chosen 
because they were prominent firms in strategic industries. For example, among the first 
adopters, Citic Securities is a member of the “national team” of stock brokers that the Chinese 
government uses when it seeks to influence the stock market, for example, after the June 
2015 stock market crash. Yangtze Power operates the giant Three Gorges Dam and had a 
75% state-linked board, including a chair who was party committee secretary (one of the top 
200 party members). These firms had extraordinarily strong state links. However, once they 
led an initial wave of adoptions, the state’s objective of visible compliance was met, and for 
the rest of the state-linked firms, cooptation instead was in the hypothesized direction from 
firm to state, with the effect of delaying compliance.
Finally, Model 7 is a supplementary analysis that uses the variables on board proportions 
to examine whether the concern for legitimacy changes over time. It does so by adding inter-
actions of board proportions of members who are particularly concerned with the state as a 
potential threat with prior adoptions. The findings show that board members in a finance role 
and board members who are shareholders initially increase the rate of adoption (main effects), 
but their influence declines as the number of prior adoptions increases (interactions).
Adoption Plan
The descriptive statistics and correlations for the logit model of the standard adoption plan 
are omitted for brevity, as they are very similar to those in Table 1. In Table 4, Model 1 
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Table 3
Results for Cox Model of Split Share Reform Adoption
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age −0.03** −0.04** −0.04** −0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.05 0.09* 0.11** 0.13**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
CSI 300 0.01 0.03 −0.02 0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Debt to equity 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 0.00+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market to book −0.06 −0.05 −0.07 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Return on assets 2.32** 3.22** 2.92** 3.04**
(0.32) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36)
Proportion overseas sales −0.03 0.19 0.13 0.30
(0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
Proportion state shares −0.09 −0.39** −0.42** −0.17
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Change in chair or CEO 0.00 −0.15* −0.06 −0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Board average age −0.02** −0.00 −0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Board proportion graduate degree 0.12 0.26+ 0.12 0.19
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Board proportion independent directors 1.22+ 0.60 1.09+ 0.13
(0.63) (0.62) (0.64) (0.61)
Board proportion top management team 
members
0.46 0.37 0.65* 0.56+
(0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Board proportion paid by company 0.01 −0.07 0.06 0.04
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Board proportion finance role −0.70 −1.06 −0.90 8.28**
(0.71) (0.69) (0.71) (1.39)
Board proportion shareholders 0.53** 0.54** 0.60** 4.56**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.30)
Exposure 12.09** 1.01** 1.28** 0.59+
(0.42) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Board proportion state position 6.72** −0.13
 (0.27) (0.13)
State hierarchy 2.31**  
 (0.08)  
Exposure × prior adoptions −0.01**  
(0.00)  
Board proportion state position × prior 
adoptions
−0.91**  
 (0.032)  
State hierarchy × prior adoptions −0.33**  
 (0.01)  
Board proportion finance role × prior 
adoptions
−1.34**
 (0.17)
Board proportion shareholders × prior 
adoptions
−0.66**
 (0.05)
Likelihood ratio, χ2 (df) 1,294.79** (62) 1,305.99** (63) 726.57** (64) 1,650.02** (63)
Log-likelihood −7,300.36 −7,323.36 −7,613.07 −7,151.34
Likelihood ratio vs. Model 1 912.27** 923.77** 344.35** 1267.80**
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Two-sided z tests for coefficients. Prior adoptions are not entered as a main effect in this 
model, because it is fully collinear with the Cox model controls for time dependence.
+p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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Table 4
Results for Logit Model of Adoption of Standard Plan
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Age −0.05+ −0.02 −0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Size −0.07 −0.05 −0.08
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
CSI 300 −0.83** −0.81** −0.81**
(0.24) (0.25) (0.24)
Debt to equity −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market to book −0.30** −0.34** −0.34**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Return on assets −0.40 −0.26 −0.36
(0.67) (0.67) (0.68)
Number of prior adoptions of standard plan −0.0004** −0.0005** −0.0004**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Proportion overseas sales 0.52 0.57 0.45
(0.59) (0.60) (0.60)
Proportion state shares 0.61+ 0.16 −0.23
(0.35) (0.38) (0.41)
Change in chair or CEO −0.20 −0.23 −0.25
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Board average age −0.03 −0.04 −0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Board proportion graduate degree −0.28 −0.34 −0.28
(0.33) (0.35) (0.34)
Board proportion independent directors −1.76 −1.77 −1.75
(1.67) (1.68) (1.67)
Board proportion top management team members 0.47 0.39 0.43
(0.81) (0.82) (0.82)
Board proportion paid by company 0.33 0.55 0.72
(0.51) (0.51) (0.52)
Board proportion finance role −2.45 −2.33 −2.31
(1.84) (1.86) (1.86)
Board proportion shareholders 0.87+ 1.06* 1.06*
(0.47) (0.48) (0.48)
Exposure 2.42** 2.782**
 (0.82) (0.83)
Board proportion state position 0.33  
 (0.37)  
State hierarchy 0.36**
 (0.13)
Likelihood ratio, χ2 160.41** 173.97** 180.79**
Likelihood ratio vs. Model 1 13.56** 20.36**
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Two-sided z tests for coefficients.
+p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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contains all control variables, and Models 2 and 3 show that the exposure has a positive and 
significant effect on the likelihood of the standard plan adoption, consistent with Hypothesis 
1b. Firms that have a wide discrepancy with the new rule show caution and use the standard 
adoption approach, as predicted. Model 2 shows no effect of board members with state posi-
tions, but Model 3 shows that the measure of state hierarchy has a positive and significant 
effect on the likelihood of the standard plan, consistent with Hypothesis 2b. Compared with 
unconnected firms, firms that have links with the state that can be used for cooptation appear 
more likely to adopt the standard practice, about which they have better information and on 
which they may also have had some influence. Figure 1 shows clearly that the adoption of the 
standard plan was most frequent early on, while the adoption of the tailored plan was initially 
less frequent but lasted longer. This suggests that early adopters experienced the greatest 
pressure to confirm to a state-prescribed plan.
The control variables show that firms in the CSI 300 were less responsive to the standard 
of coercive change and, surprisingly, firms became less likely to adopt the standard plan 
when it became more common. A high market-to-book ratio also led to less likelihood of 
adopting the standard plan. Other control variables do not yield significant results, highlight-
ing the central role of the theoretical variables in predicting this outcome.
Discussion and Conclusion
We introduce a relational view of firm reactions to coercive pressures and argue that this 
view is necessary because firms see coercive institutional pressures as imposed by a power-
ful actor rather than as taken-for-granted practices. As a result, relational theory of how the 
firm reacts through adoption timing and potential decoupling can best predict behaviors. 
Following this view, we propose theoretically and show empirically that the heterogeneity in 
firm responses to state-initiated coercive institutional change can be explained by the relation 
between the state and the firm. The first relation is firm exposure, or discrepancy between 
current practices and new rules, which invokes pressure to adopt the rule and leads to quicker 
and less decoupled adoption. The second relation is cooptation, obtained through state links, 
which provides access to internal state information and leads to delayed and less decoupled 
adoption. The analyses showed that the effect of these two firm-state relations on the speed 
and degree of adoption were strongly supported. The power balance of exposure and coopta-
tion shows the benefit of a resource dependence argument that considers both power and 
counterpower (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Our study takes a fresh look at the structure-versus-agency debate in institutional theory 
(e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997) through raising the question of 
when firms will delay and decouple in response to coercive institutional pressures from the 
state. This entails closer examination of the relation between the firm and the state through 
taking four steps. The first is to draw attention to state coercion as a mechanism of change 
that has been understudied (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999); particularly, the well-known phenom-
enon of slow rule adoption by some organizations has not been explained well (Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1983). The second step is to see this as strategic action, as firm decision makers are 
fully aware that rules are imposed and carry costs, benefits, and risk of noncompliance or 
decoupled compliance (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Wry et al., 2013). The third 
step is to develop a relational theory explaining why rule adoption specifically and firm com-
pliance to coercive isomorphism more generally are variable across firms and can be 
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explained by examining the dyadic power balance between the firm and the source of coer-
cion. An important part of the theory is the firm exposure to state coercive pressure as a result 
of the discrepancy between its current practice and the new rules, which in turn reduces the 
ability to delay rule adoption (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The theory also considers how 
cooptation of the state gives informational advantages allowing delay of adoption but is also 
an exchange relation with the state, causing adoption to be faithful rather than decoupled. 
Finally, exposure and cooptation are firm characteristics that, just as in mimetic isomor-
phism, have greater explanatory power early on, before the new rule has become institution-
alized and seen as necessary for all firms.
This study shows that coercive pressure needs to be studied more. It is not as automatic as 
the term coercive implies; in fact, one can observe the puzzle of delayed and decoupled com-
pliance by firms under state pressure. Adoption is not a direct result of regulatory change but 
a strategic action in which the firm appears to make cost-benefit assessments (e.g., Fremeth 
& Shaver, 2014; Ritchie & Melnyk, 2012). It is natural that the interests of its main decision 
makers affect the outcome, as seen through the control variable of board member stock own-
ership, but it is a notable demonstration of the firm cost-benefit assessment that adoption is 
affected by exposure and ability to coopt the state. Clearly, state rules set parameters for firm 
actions, but they do not determine them (Greve & Zhang, 2016). Given the extent and legiti-
macy of the state power as compared with other powerful organizations, this finding opens 
for a renewed look at how firms act to manage the demands of powerful actors in the environ-
ment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Future studies examining other organizations than the state 
would be interesting, such as large-assembly or service-providing firms that place demands 
on their suppliers.
This study adds to the debate about how public policies mandate or encourage change 
within business organizations (Kochan, Guillen, Hunter, & O’Mahony, 2009). The institu-
tional and political context of China—where government officials intervene in firm deci-
sions—provides a good context for scrutinizing the impact of firm-state relationships on firm 
strategies exactly because delayed adoption is surprising. Our findings indicate that state rule 
changes do not imply rapid and full compliance. Identifying such behavior deepens our 
understanding of the links between corporate and national governance and how such interac-
tions can lead to unequal treatment of firms. In particular, the slower adoption of the split-
share structure reform by firms with state links shows that state agents may use their political 
influence to delay state reforms. Future studies on how cooptation is made possible and what 
effects it has would be very valuable.
In these data, the firm advantage derived from cooptation kept shares nontradable longer, 
maintaining an ownership structure with complications for capital market transactions such 
as mergers and acquisitions and refinancing. Firms adopt new rules at different times, with 
greater risk and cost for the less-connected firms that adopt early (Ritchie & Melnyk, 2012). 
This matters because coercive pressures are used for a reason: Firms would not adopt on their 
own because it is not in their interest to comply, at least as the interest is defined by the top 
decision makers. In this case, the resistance against state pressures was partly for political 
reasons related to state control, partly for risk concerns that turned out to be unfounded. For 
other rule changes, the resistance may be related to costs that are imposed on firms to fulfill 
societal goals, such as reduced pollution or greater employee benefits. The firm ability to 
delay adoption through state links forces the less-connected firms to take on greater costs and 
risk, possibly even the risk of adopting rules that will be revoked by the state when the 
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consequences are better known. State links thus give the benefit of letting other firms do the 
trials of new rules. The existence of such benefits from state links also means that firms 
engage in competition to obtain them, which will affect firm-state relations.
The relational theory and findings developed here have implications for other theories as 
well. One important implication is for the resource-based view of the firm, which now has a 
significant research record with a focus on how firms develop and maintain distinct capabili-
ties (Barney, 1991; Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001). State ties that yield cooptation capa-
bilities are clearly within the scope of the resource-based view and match its development to 
examine how firms manage their relation to institutional environments (Barney et al., 2001). 
Also, this work illustrates how firms can resist coercive pressures through either low expo-
sure or high cooptation capabilities. This shows clearly the potential for firms to maintain 
institutional logics against pressures (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 
2011), such as those that would result from state coercion or public rankings (Rowley, 
Shipilov, & Greve, 2016).
Future research opportunities on responses to rule pressures are abundant. It would be 
valuable to have more research, not just on how individual firms respond, but also on how 
these responses shape important collective outcomes, such as industrial development and 
state policy implementation. At the level of firm adoption, key tasks would be to replicate the 
findings on exposure and cooptation as drivers of adoption speed and decoupling. Because 
the theory applies to other sources and destinations of coercive pressure than the state versus 
firms, research extending the findings to other contexts will be valuable. A relational theory 
of responses to coercive pressures should apply when their source is another firm or a social 
movement. Investigating such processes could uncover mechanisms other than exposure and 
cooptation, as well as additional sources of exposure and decoupling than what we studied 
here. Specifically, exposure can be from media or social movement attention, not just the 
actual discrepancy from the new rules; likewise, cooptation can be through behaviors such as 
endorsement, not just through network ties.[AQ: 7] Each mechanism is suitable for much 
additional research.
It would also be promising to extend the theoretical lens in two directions. A firm-centered 
approach would be to examine additional firm characteristics, especially top management 
team characteristics, that influence the timing and form of adoption. We would expect findings 
that resonate with coalitional views of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), such as managers 
responding more favorably to changes matching their backgrounds. For a change as in our 
study, for example, training in Western management techniques could lead to increased will-
ingness to adopt early. The other direction of an environmental approach would look not only 
at the dyadic relation between a firm and the state but also at firm networks and their effect on 
policy formulation and implementation (Barley, 2010). We already had an interesting finding 
through the discovery that firms became less likely to adopt the standard plan as it became 
more common, suggesting that the tailored plan, preferred by many firms, was easier to adopt 
in an environment with many prior adoptions that did not use a decoupled approach, possibly 
because decoupling is harder to detect late in an institutionalization process.
Firm responses to coercive pressures are an interesting topic of research because they are 
less isomorphic than commonly assumed, in large part because firm responses to coercion 
have a strategic element. As a result, relational theory examining how the source and destina-
tion of the coercive pressure interrelate can produce valuable insights into the timing and 
form of compliance and can reveal late compliance and partial compliance even in contexts 
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that are commonly believed to involve a high degree of regulation and firm compliance. The 
relational theory of firm responses to state coercion developed here proved effective in pre-
dicting firm responses to a significant rule change in the Chinese market reform and clearly 
has potential for much additional work in other contexts. Although we are several steps away 
from it, rich theory and evidence on how firm networks, state-firm dyads, and firm charac-
teristics jointly determine responses to coercive pressures are within reach.
Notes
1. “Big Banks Struggle to Pass Fed’s ‘Stress Tests,’” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2015.
2. “For Banks, 2014 Was a Year of Big Penalties,” Wall Street Journal, December 30 1994.
3. All quotes are from interviews done by one of the authors and are translated from Mandarin.
4. Under the state socialism logic (Szelenyi, 1978),[AQ: 8] goods and services are channeled through firms 
to the state, which allocates resources back to firms and distributes output to consumers. Firms serve political and 
social objectives through a hierarchy of government control at the local, provincial, regional, and national levels. 
This differs from the market capitalism firm that interacts with a market and is governed and valued by shareholders.
5. “Measures on Administration of Split-Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies,” published by China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, May 9, 2005.
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